“Disregard and Dependency,” by Jeremy Snyder
A RESPONSE TO Javier Hidalgo (2013), “Do Employers Have Obligations to Pay Their Workers a Living Wage?”, Bus Ethics J Rev 1(11): 69-75.
Abstract: Although Hidalgo (2013) accurately identifies mine as a moralized account of dependence, he misconstrues the role it plays in my (2008) argument. A specified duty of beneficence is not based on the dependency of one person on another, but on the idea that our relationships with others provide the opportunity to disregard specific others’ basic needs. Hidalgo (2013: 74) thus misattributes to me the view that “relationships of dependence activate special obligations.” Only by conflating my argument for a specified duty of beneficence with my use of dependency to limit and clarify the extent of these demands, does my argument appear circular.
To download the full PDF, click here: Snyder Responds to Hidalgo.
“What is the Best Way to Argue Against the Profit-Maximization Principle?” by Abraham Singer
A COMMENT ON Waheed Hussain (2012), “Corporations, Profit Maximization and the Personal Sphere,” Econ & Phil 28(3): 311–331.
Abstract: This brief paper engages with Hussain’s critique of what he refers to as the “efficiency argument for profit maximization.” Here I argue that Hussain’s strategy of seeing the corporation as an extension of the private sphere is not a very effective way of challenging the profit-maximization norm.
To download the full PDF, click here: Singer on Hussain.
“Do Employers Have Obligations to Pay Their Workers a Living Wage?” by Javier Hidalgo
A COMMENT ON Jeremy Snyder (2008), “Needs Exploitation,” Ethic Theory & Moral Prac 11(4): 389–405.
Abstract: Jeremy Snyder argues that employers have obligations to pay their workers a living wage if workers stand in relationships of dependence with their employers. I argue that Snyder’s argument for this conclusion faces a dilemma. Snyder can adopt either a descriptive or a moralized account of dependence. If Snyder adopts a descriptive account, then it is false that dependence activates obligations to pay a living wage. If Snyder endorses a moralized account of dependence, then Snyder’s argument is circular. So, Snyder’s argument fails to establish that employers have obligations to pay their workers a living wage.
To download the full PDF, click here: Hidalgo on Snyder.
“Political Corporate Social Responsibility: Some Clarifications,” by Glen Whelan
A RESPONSE TO Pierre-Yves Néron (2013), “Toward a Political Theory of the Business Firm? A Comment on ‘Political CSR’”, Bus Ethics J Rev 1(3): 14-21.
Abstract: Multinational Corporations (MNCs) engage in various political activities, can have significant political impacts, and can be designed with different political concerns in mind. In arguing that there is much theorizing to do in these regards, I recently outlined a critical research agenda for what I term the political perspective of corporate social responsibility (or political CSR for short). Whilst Néron acknowledges that the agenda I set out is important and valuable, he also suggests that the label I use – i.e. political CSR – is too constraining. I here make a number of clarifications that explain why this is not the case.
To download the full PDF, click here: Whelan Responds to Néron.
“Morality Meet Politics, Politics Meet Morality: Exploring the Political in Political Responsibility” by Florian Wettstein
A RESPONSE TO Jeffery Smith (2013), “Corporate Human Rights Obligations: Moral or Political?”, Bus Ethics J Rev 1(2): 7-13.
Abstract: This brief response to Smith focuses on his distinction between moral and political responsibility in general and how it relates to human rights in particular. I argue that the notion of political responsibility as it is used in the debate on political CSR often does not exclude morality but is based on it.
To download the full PDF, click here: Wettstein on Smith.
“Market Failure or Government Failure? A Response to Jaworski” by Joseph Heath
A RESPONSE TO Peter Jaworski (2013), “Moving Beyond Market Failure: When the Failure is Government’s,” Bus Ethics J Rev 1(1): 1-6.
Abstract: Peter Jaworski objects to my “market failures” approach to business ethics on the grounds that in some cases I have mislabeled as “market failure” what are in fact instances of “government failure.” While acknowledging that my overall approach might better be refered to as “Paretian,” I resist Jaworski’s specific criticism. I argue that the term government failure should not be used to describe market transactions that are made less efficient through government intervention, but should be reserved for cases in which the market mechanism has been suspended and the transaction is occurring, inefficiently, through the organizational power of the state.
To download the full PDF, click here: Heath on Jaworski.
“The Cost of Usury” by Robert Mayer
A RESPONSE TO Matt Zwolinski (2013), “Are Usurious? Another New Argument For the Prohibition of High Interest Loans?”, Bus Ethics J Rev 1(4): 22–27.
Abstract: When states deregulate the price of payday loans, most consumers will pay more for emergency cash than when a moderate usury cap is imposed. But advocates of price deregulation, including Matt Zwolinski, fail to discuss the distributive effects of their favored policy or to explain why most borrowers should pay more than is necessary for a cash advance. The objections Zwolinski raises against my argument for imposing a usury ceiling in this market miss the mark because they do not justify the increased cost consumers must bear when the price of a payday loan is allowed to float.
To download the full PDF, click here: Mayer on Zwolinski.